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Executive Summary 
 
In August 2016, Publish What You Pay (PWYP) asked the research team to 
undertake a short but intensive study to review (i) the early transposition 
of The Reports on Payments to Governments Regulations 2014 from the EU 
Accounting Directive Chapter 10 into UK law, and (ii) the implementation of 
the Regulations by a sample of reporting companies within the ambit of the 
UK law.  
 
In considering the transposition of Chapter 10 of the EU Accounting 
Directive into UK legislation, the aim of the Regulations was elaborated on 
by the UK Government:   
 
“Across the world, natural resources are worth $billions and make 
substantial contributions to the public budgets of many developing 
countries. However, the citizens of these countries often remain extremely 
poor. … The aim of this [transposition] is to raise global standards of 
transparency in the extractives sector [to] improve accountability by 
allowing citizens in these countries to access information about payments 
made, and increase their ability to hold their governments to account 
regarding use of the revenues”1 
 
Study Approach 
 
Our study encompasses: (i) reflections on the construction of the 
Regulations and their interpretation by interested parties; (ii) analysis of 
disclosures in the form of Reports on Payments to Governments (RPG) of a 
sample of extractive companies coming within the ambit of the UK law after 
the implementation of the Regulations; and (iii) reflections on the views of 
stakeholders and constituencies on the nature, content and usefulness of 
the RPG.  
 
The drafting of the UK legislation, with attention given more specifically to 
how the EU Directive was transposed into UK law, is here evaluated. Reports 
on Payments to Governments of a sample of 47 extractive companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 3 unlisted extractive companies 
that had filed their report with Companies House are analysed, together 
with interviews with key stakeholders.  
 
Key Findings 
 
Reflections on the construction of the law: 
• Reflections on the construction of the law raise some concerns about 
the reliability of information required to be disclosed in a context 
where that information is neither audited (not even in terms of 
                                      
1 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2
98603/bis-14-669-impact-assessment-consultation-on-the-uk-implementation-of-
the-eu-accounting-directive.pdf 
4 
 
limited assurance) nor reconciled to audited annual reports and 
accounts, albeit that the information is of use in terms of its rationale. 
• The language of the law is not as simple nor straightforward as it 
could be, meaning that a range of interpretations are possible for 
certain constructs, potentially creating conflict with reflecting the 
spirit or substance of the Accounting Directive. This is particularly 
problematic when interpreting reporting requirements relating to 
joint ventures and project-by-project disclosures. 
• There is a lack of cohesiveness between the RPG Regulations and 
other regulatory initiatives such as BEPS Action 13 and the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Although these other 
initiatives may not be legally binding, they are nevertheless 
becoming influential as government backed initiatives to support 
transparency reporting by companies. 
 
Analysis of the RPG and related disclosures of 47 LSE-listed and 3 non-LSE 
listed extractive companies indicates: 
 
• All companies disclosed the country of the government2 to which 
payments are made. Most companies disclosed the governments to 
which payments are made (although 10 do not specify the specific 
tax authority), the amount paid to each government (10 did provide 
a breakdown but not a total) and the total amount per type of 
payment made to each government (5 did not - one of them did 
provide total amount but did not specify the government and 4 
companies did provide a breakdown but did not provide a total).  
• The majority of companies (36 and 38, respectively) disclosed the 
total amount of payments made to distinct projects and the total 
amount per type of payment, respectively. 
• Taxes levied (46 companies), fees (38) and royalties (31) were the 
most frequently disclosed types of payments made to governments, 
followed by infrastructure improvements (22) and production 
entitlements (16). Only a few companies in the sample disclosed 
information about bonus payments (5) or dividends (2). 
• Not many companies elaborated on how they reflected the substance 
of payments over their legal form. 
• Not many companies disclosed information about payments in-kind, 
and where they did, disclosure was often partial.  
• Few companies reconciled their RPG disclosures to related disclosures 
within their audited annual report and accounts or their CSR report.  
 
Views of stakeholders and constituencies on the nature, content and 
usefulness of the RPG are here gathered through a series of semi-structured 
interviews (see Table 2 for full list of interviewees). Section 5 concludes 
with an analysis of interviews3 with three key stakeholders, being:  a 
legislator (acronym here, LG); a civil society campaigner for corporate 
                                      
2 As defined in the Regulations, government means any national, regional or local 
authority of a country, and includes a department, agency or undertaking that is a 
subsidiary undertaking where the authority is the parent undertaking. 
3 Interviews were transcribed and carefully assessed for key views and insights. 
Quotations from interviewees are given in the text. 
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transparency (CT); and an extractive industry representative (IR). The 
insights gathered from these interviews as well as others have been used 
to inform our conclusions and analysis. 
 
Recommendations 
 
The findings of this report suggest a number of recommendations for civil 
society to campaign for, for legislators to consider in upcoming reviews and 
for companies to take note of in terms of developing best practice. 
 
1. Consider whether the Regulations would benefit from an audit 
requirement for RPG. 
2. Maintain the current de minimis level for reporting payments but 
ensure that the Regulations guard against possible disaggregation.4 
3. Provide further clarity on the term ‘substantially interconnected’, as 
it applies to projects. 
4. Amend the Regulations to ensure that companies report payments 
made to governments on their behalf by joint venture operators (on 
a proportional basis relative to their share in the joint venture). 
5. Provide clarity on the process for monitoring compliance with the 
Regulations. Specifically outline the point of appeal where instances 
of non-compliance are evident and also provide assurance that an 
institutional mechanism is in place for checking compliance. 
6. Consider making it a requirement under the Regulations for RPG to 
be reconciled to annual accounts. 
7. Consider widening the definition of “extractive industries” under the 
Regulations to take account of integrated business models employed 
by businesses in the extractive sectors. 
8. Consider how the Regulations can be better integrated with other 
transparency initiatives such as EITI and the OECD’s BEPS Action 13. 
9. Ensure that the reports are used and evidence is provided of their 
usage in the spirit of cooperation to better enhance transparency in 
the sector. 
10.Consider reviewing the format in which the RPG are filed in order to 
ensure user friendliness. 
11.Companies should consider providing additional narrative disclosures 
in RPG to enable better use of the information. This may include 
disclosure of where there are no reportable payments. 
  
                                      
4 De minimis here denotes the size criteria included in the legislation, which allows 
some companies to fall outside of its scope. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Aim, scope and approach of this study 
 
In August 2016, PWYP asked the research team to undertake a short but 
intensive study to review (i) the early transposition of The Reports on 
Payments to Governments Regulations 2014 (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
Regulations') from the EU Accounting Directive (Ch. 10 of Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council) into UK law, 
and (ii) the implementation of the Regulations by a sample of reporting 
companies within the ambit of the UK law. The Regulations became effective 
for reporting periods starting on or after 1 January 2015, with the 
acceptance of Statutory Instrument 3209 (“SI 3209”).  Compliance with the 
Regulations requires UK-incorporated ‘large’ or ‘public interest’ entities 
active in the extractive or primary logging industries to publish a Report on 
Payments to Governments. In addition, the Financial Conduct Authority’s 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules, implementing the EU Transparency 
Directive Amending Directive (2013/50/EU), article 1(5), applies the same 
requirement to report under the Regulations to London Stock Exchange 
Main Market listed companies in extractive sectors. The RPG legislation 
constitutes a form of country-by-country reporting in that it requires 
reporting of payments made by in-scope companies5 to governments by the 
country of the recipient government. It facilitates transparency regarding 
payments made to governments by companies, many of which operate in 
developing countries around the world to extract natural resources.   
 
The research has three main objectives: 
 
1. To reflect on the Regulations and how they have been interpreted by 
stakeholders/constituencies/interested parties; 
2. To review the available RPG of a selected sample of UK extractive 
companies after the implementation of the Regulations, and to 
identify reporting practice specifically in relation to: 
i. Categories and definitions of payments made to 
governments and the countries and governments 
disclosed 
ii. Project aggregation  
iii. Indicating transparency of payments made on behalf 
of joint venture participants by operating partners 
iv. Indicating transparency of payments made to state 
owned enterprises acting as field operators 
v. Attempting to indicate potential instances of non-
compliance with the UK Regulations beyond those 
indicated in ii to iv, such as non-identification of 
government recipients and non-reporting of value and 
volume where required for in-kind payments 
(particularly production entitlements). 
                                      
5 ‘In-scope’ companies or entities here signifies those companies falling under the 
provisions of the legislation. 
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3. To consider the views of stakeholders and constituencies about 
transparency reporting and the nature, content and usefulness of the 
RPG. 
 
The research was undertaken in three stages: 
 
• Review of the legislation (informed by legal Counsel) and Industry 
Guidance to indicate possible interpretations of the law. 
• Design and usage of a disclosure checklist to benchmark mandatory 
RPG regulations’ disclosures and voluntary disclosures of a sample of 
extractive companies.  
• Design and usage of questions to ask stakeholders and constituencies 
in semi-structured interviews about the RPG regulations. 
 
The research focused on gathering evidence in order to draw conclusions 
regarding how effective the regulations are, how the regulations are being 
put into practice by industry at company level and how useful the 
information reported is for civil society and other users. Recommendations 
are outlined; it is intended that these recommendations will be useful to 
contribute to the separate government scheduled consultations concerning 
the UK and EU legislation.  
 
The research does not address the issue of government reporting in 
resource rich countries. This project also does not take into consideration 
all of the companies identified as having a reporting requirement as not all 
of them had been required to submit a report following the RPG regulations 
at the time data was collected.6 
Relevance to stakeholders 
 
This study is designed to obtain a better understanding of: (i) how 
mandatory transparency reporting regulations have been developed and 
interpreted in the UK context; (ii) how large extractive companies and other 
in-scope entities have implemented such reporting in practice; (iii) insights 
from stakeholders and constituencies regarding such reporting.  The 
outcome of this research intends to inform contemporary debates on 
accountability and transparency practices in the extractives sector.   
 
This study has the potential to contribute to the development of 
transparency reporting in the UK, the EU and beyond. The empirical 
evidence gathered will underpin recommendations made by the research 
team. These evidence-based policy recommendations will be useful for 
PWYP and other interested stakeholders in communications with 
government, regulators and standard setters and in general campaign 
activity. 
                                      
6 We acknowledge feedback from several conferences where this work has been 
presented (BAFA conference, Heriot-Watt, 2017; EAA conference, Valencia, 2017; 
SASE conference, Lyon, 2017), from a joint PWYP and University of Sheffield 
workshop held in London, 2017 and from students at the University Sheffield 
studying the module on case analysis, which focused substantively on the report 
on payments to governments. 
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Specifically, PWYP will be able to draw on this study to develop their 
response to statutory review of the Regulations scheduled to be completed 
by The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 
(formerly known as The Department for Business Innovation and Skills and 
referred to as such in the UK Regulations) by 1 December 2017. This study 
should similarly inform a review of the EU level provisions scheduled in 2018 
(for which further research by the research team is planned on EU 
implementation beyond the UK setting). 
Structure of this report 
 
This report presents five further sections. Section 2 presents a brief 
contextual overview. Section 3 outlines the detailed research approach.  
Sections 4 and 5 present our findings relating to the aims of our study, 
reflecting on the Regulations and reviewing disclosures in RPG, with related 
views from stakeholder interviews discussed in these two sections. In 
Section 6 we present our conclusion and policy recommendations.  
 
2.0 Contextual Overview 
The legislation 
 
The Regulations are a transposition into UK law of Chapter 10 of Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (the 
“Directive”). The Regulations were brought into UK law in advance of the 
transposition deadline of 20 July 2015 (a deadline that several other 
member states did not meet) and also in advance of the rest of the 
Directive, which was transposed as part of an amendment to the Companies 
Act 2006 on the transposition date.  
 
The reason cited for early transposition of Chapter 10 in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to SI 3209 is that it reflects a political commitment by the 
then UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, as part of the UK’s G8 Presidency, 
to demonstrate the UK’s commitment to the global transparency agenda. 
 
The Regulations require all large undertakings and all public-interest 
entities active in extractive industries (oil and gas, mining and logging of 
primary forests) to prepare and make public a report on the payments they 
make to governments globally.  
 
As noted above, the legislation will be subject to a consultation at the UK 
level during 2017 to assess the impact of the Regulations following the first 
reporting cycle, which for most affected undertakings will have coincided 
with the filing of their statutory accounts for the year ended 31 December 
2015 or 31 March 2016. Also, as noted in the previous section, a similar 
review at the EU level is planned in 2018. 
 
9 
 
Transparency and accountability 
 
The adoption of these regulations follows calls for greater transparency in 
the extractive industries in order to understand and address the 
phenomenon known as “the resource curse”. This phrase describes the 
situation whereby countries relatively rich in natural resources somehow 
fail to translate this wealth into securing improvement in the socio-
economic conditions of their populations. This is a particularly serious issue 
in situations where socio-economic conditions are poor. The issue is also 
controversial as multi-national enterprises are able to generate seemingly 
large returns for their investors from extracting these resources. 
 
The calls for greater accountability and transparency (or openness) focus 
substantively on two key areas.  First, there is an interest in making clearer 
the socio-economic impact of extractive activities carried out in the 
relatively resource rich countries upon these countries themselves. Second, 
and more specifically, there is an interest in disclosing how much money is 
received, arising from such activities, directly by the central and local 
administrations of every relatively resource rich country’s government – 
and in making visible by whom the payments (in forms such as corporate 
taxes, fees, license payments and royalties) are made. Thus, it is intended 
that a light is cast on the resource curse and aspects of the performance of 
relatively resource rich countries as well as the financial sums paid directly 
by corporations to the governments of these countries. 
 
Contemporary developments in the international 
context  
 
The UK vote to leave the EU (“Brexit”) and the election of the Trump 
administration in the USA have altered the political landscape in which the 
Regulations now operate.  
 
The effect that Brexit will have on most individual pieces of EU legislation 
that have been transposed into UK law is as yet unclear. The government 
has stated its intention to introduce a “Great Repeal Bill” in the next Queen’s 
speech. The purpose of the Bill will be to repeal certain Acts, such as the 
European Communities Act 1972, which will not be compatible with UK law 
post Brexit. Furthermore, the government has stated that: 
 
“…the Great Repeal Bill will contain delegated powers to enable the 
Government to adapt any laws on the statute book that originate from the 
EU so as to fit the UK’s new relationship with the EU. This may require major 
swathes of the statute book to be assessed to determine which laws will be 
able to function after Brexit day.”7 
 
There has as yet been no stated intention from the government to alter the 
Regulations imposed by SI 3209, as part of the Brexit process. The 
                                      
7 http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7793 
 
10 
 
Regulations were adopted by the UK early and seemingly enthusiastically 
as part of an agenda to promote greater transparency in business. The early 
adoption coupled with the high-profile support of the Prime Minister at the 
time, in the G8 forum, could be taken as a positive indication that the 
Regulations are likely to remain in place in the UK despite changes to the 
UK’s relationship with the EU.  
 
It is worth noting, however, that the global political environment has 
changed significantly since the Regulations were brought into force, most 
notably with the election of Donald Trump as President of the USA. Trump 
campaigned for election with promises to stimulate business, partly through 
cutting regulation. Following his inauguration as President, Trump gave 
Presidential approval for the repeal of a rule imposed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) implementing section 1504 of the Dodd Frank 
Act (s1504), which required US extractive companies to disclose payments 
to governments with similar requirements to Chapter 10. At the time of 
writing, the law (Dodd-Frank, including s1504) remains intact, and the SEC 
remains time bound to produce a new rule by February 20188. The voiding 
of the SEC rule for s1504 may be interpreted by some as giving US 
companies a competitive advantage over their counterparts in Europe, 
including in the UK, as a result of the reduced disclosure requirements. In 
this respect, Trump’s election potentially poses a threat to the UK 
Regulations and beyond these to the Regulations at the EU level. However, 
it is the case that companies themselves, as well as civil society and other 
commentators argue that greater transparency is in fact in companies’ 
enlightened self-interest and helps secure their social licence to operate.   
 
3.0 Approach to the Research 
Reflections on the construction and interpretation of 
the Regulations  
 
A focus of this research is to assess the drafting of the legislation, with 
attention being given more specifically to how the EU Directive was 
transposed into UK law. This involves assessment of whether the legislation 
in its current form is likely to achieve its substantive and ostensible 
rationale. Finer parts of the legislation are examined in detail in line with 
concerns being raised that these may be interpreted in such a way as to 
dilute the effectiveness of the Regulations. Specifically, the Regulations, 
Chapter 10 of the EU Accounting Directive, and guidelines published by the 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) are reviewed. The 
assessment of these documents is explored further through a semi-
structured interview with legal counsel.  Specific areas of concern were: 
• The treatment of joint ventures under the Regulations 
• The transparency of payments made to state owned enterprises 
acting as field operators in the oil and gas sector 
• The aggregation of payments at a project level 
• The de minimis reporting requirement 
                                      
8 https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-joint-resolution/41/text  
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Analysis of the RPG of extractive companies falling 
within the ambit of the UK law 
 
The sample 
 
In order to examine the disclosures made by companies and assess the 
nature and scope of information provided, a sample of RPG were analysed. 
The sample is made up of 47 companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and 3 unlisted companies that had filed their report with 
Companies House. Our sample of 50 companies is detailed in Appendix 1 
and captures those RPG produced by companies by early December 2016, 
which is when we completed the collection of empirical disclosure evidence 
for this report.  
 
An additional two companies did submit a file to Companies House, but they 
did not report any payments - they disclosed a value of zero. These two 
companies’ annual report and accounts were analysed and it was found that 
both of them appear to have been performing very poorly in financial terms 
with large tax losses. They are therefore excluded from the analysis on the 
basis that they are unlikely to have made any reportable payments. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, 23 (46%) companies in the sample are Oil 
and Gas producers, 16 (32%) are mining companies and 11 (22%) operate 
in ‘other’ LSE categories, which include: Industrial Metals, Gas, Water & 
Multi-utilities, Forestry & Paper, Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution, 
General Financial, and Food & Drug retailers.9 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the 50 reporting companies, 28 are incorporated in Great Britain (GB), 
21 outside the EU, and 1 within the EU (see Table 1).   
 
                                       
9 The operations of the companies included in this category relate to the extractive 
industries and do, therefore, fall under The Regulations. 
46%
32%
22%
Distribution of companies based on 
sector
Oil & Gas Producers
Mining
Other
Figure 1: Companies' distribution based on sector 
See Appendix 1 Panel C for companies included in 
“Other” sectors 
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The RPG have to be submitted by companies to UK Companies House using 
a CVS spreadsheet output. However, Table 1 shows, three different 
reporting formats of RPG were discerned in our sample: standard CSV 
spreadsheets only (9 companies); CVS spreadsheet plus a short PDF report 
(14 companies); CVS spreadsheet plus a long PDF report (6 companies); 
and a PDF report only (21 companies). We analysed the CVS spreadsheet 
of the 29 companies that presented their report under the RPG regulations 
using this format, as obtained from Companies House.  For the remaining 
21 companies, PDF files published on the respective company website were 
used for the analysis.10   
 
 
Table 1: Sample profile and disclosure style of RPG11 
Sector Oil and Gas Mining Other Total 
Jurisdicti
on 
GB EU Non-
EU 
GB EU Non-
EU 
GB EU Non-
EU 
 
CSV 
spreadshe
et 
3 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 9 
CSV 
spreadshe
et + Short 
PDF 
6 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 14 
CSV 
spreadshe
et + Long 
PDF 
2 0 0 2 0 1* 1 0 0 6 
PDF only 1 0 9 1 0 3** 1 1 5** 21 
Sub-total 12 0 11 11 0 5 5 1 5  
Total 23 16 11 50 
Note: GB = incorporated in Great Britain; EU = incorporated in EU, excluding GB; Non-EU 
= incorporated outside EU; *Non-EU company incorporated in Jersey; **Non-EU includes 
companies incorporated in Jersey and British Virgin Islands. 
In addition to analysing all 50 companies in the sample for compliance with 
the Regulations, the “long” PDF reports of 7 companies, hereafter referred 
to as “Sample7” (BP, Glencore, Evraz, Rosneft,12 Royal Dutch Shell, Rio 
Tinto, BHP Billiton) are analysed in depth. Sample7 companies produced 
                                      
10 CSV spreadsheets were not expected for 18 of these 21 companies as they were 
incorporated outside of the UK. However, 3 GB that were expected to submit a CSV 
spreadsheet had not done so at the time we collected our data.  
11 Appendix 1 shows the files available and files used for each company for the 
disclosure analysis. 
12 Rosneft is incorporated in Russia and did not produce a CSV spreadsheet; all 
other companies in Sample7 produced a CSV and long PDF. 
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PDF reports (designated here as “long”) that included tables explaining the 
different payments to governments and detailed information on how the 
Regulations had been interpreted, infographics and data tables, details of 
economic contributions not captured by the Regulations and in one case 
(BP) a ‘limited assurance’ report. Some other companies in the sample 
produced a “short” PDF, generally of no more than eight pages with tables 
showing payments and in some instances short narratives, which in most 
cases focus on explaining the requirement under which RPG were filed and 
the basis of preparation. 
 
Disclosure Checklist and analysis 
 
A disclosure checklist was developed for the purpose of analysis based on 
detailed scrutiny of the following three source documents:  
 
• S.I. 2014 No. 3209: The Reports on Payments to Governments 
Regulations 2014,  
• EU Accounting Directive: Chapter 10 - Report on Payments to 
Governments, and  
• The Reports on Payments to Governments Regulations 2014 (as 
amended): Industry Guidance.13  
 
The disclosure checklist includes both the mandatory disclosures and a list 
of further possible voluntary disclosures (Appendix 2). It was used to note 
down the relevant RPG mandatory disclosures by each company in the 
sample. The RPG were analysed and the results transferred onto an excel 
spreadsheet to produce descriptive summaries.  Further detailed analysis 
of voluntary disclosures was undertaken for Sample7 companies.  
 
Prior to finalising the disclosure checklist, early analysis of 23 companies 
was undertaken using PDF files available on the respective company 
websites (Appendix 3). It is of interest that inconsistencies are evident 
between the RPG disclosures made by companies in their CSV spreadsheet 
compared to their PDF report (which some companies chose to post online 
- from preliminary analysis of 23 companies for which both a CSV and a 
PDF file was available at the time of data collection). Two companies specify 
the government to which the payments were made in their PDF file, but not 
in the CSV file submitted to Companies House, while one other company 
does specify it in the CSV file but not in the PDF file. Another example of 
inconsistency between the two different file types relates to the total 
amount of payments made for each project; one company does not provide 
any project information in the PDF file, despite the fact that all the 
necessary information is in the CSV file, while another company provides a 
breakdown of the payments along with the total as part of the PDF file, but 
only a breakdown of the payments when it comes to the CSV file. 
 
Our analysis of disclosures relevant to RPG also includes a review of the 
audited annual report and accounts (“accounts”) and corporate social 
responsibility reports (“CSR”) for Sampe7 companies. When analysing the 
                                      
13 IOGP (2016). The Reports on Payments to Government Regulations 2014 [as 
amended]: Industry Guidance. 
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Sample7 companies, specific attention was paid to the following disclosures 
in the companies’ accounts: segmental reporting disclosures (IFRS 8), the 
investment in subsidiaries note, the strategic review and the tax note (IAS 
12) as well as the disclosures on litigation provisions, where present. These 
disclosures were examined in detail in conjunction with the RPG. It was 
hoped in this regard that, by examining the IFRS 8 and IAS 12 notes, the 
RPG information could be linked to the Accounts, thus contextualising the 
amounts of tax paid in relation to the performance of the group as a whole. 
The investment in subsidiaries note was analysed to assess the total 
geographic coverage of the group and so compare this to the coverage of 
the RPG. The strategic review and the litigation provisions were reviewed in 
order to highlight any cases where tax was in dispute in a particular territory 
or where tax was highlighted as a particular risk in an effort to uncover any 
cases of non-compliance or aggressive tax policy. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
From our analysis of the RPG of the companies in our sample, a number of 
interesting findings emerge. These findings, together with observations 
made in the literature and from reflecting on the construction of the 
Regulations, were used to design a set of questions to guide semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders and constituencies. The 
interviewees were identified through the researchers’ and PWYP contacts 
(see Table 2). Interviewees were consulted on a variety of issues, including: 
civil society and calls for transparency; development and introduction of 
transparency legislation; industry lobbying and guidelines; threshold; audit 
and assurance; project aggregation; joint ventures; government 
consultations. Relevant and interesting observations from these interviews 
are used throughout Sections 4 and 5 of this report. 
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Table 2: Interviewee profile and stakeholder/constituency group  
Stakeholder 
/constituency Group 
Interviewee Position 
Preparer P1 Tax Accountant 
Industry bodies In1 Representative of or 
consultant to industry 
 In2 Representative of or 
consultant to industry 
 In3 Representative of or 
consultant to industry 
 In4 Representative of or 
consultant to industry 
Auditor A1 Partner 
Legal counsel L1 Retired 
NGO transparency 
campaigners 
T1 Campaigner 
 T2 Campaigner 
NGO Users of and 
campaigners for 
transparency reports  
N1 NGO Advocate 
 N2 NGO Advocate 
Civil Servant/legislator C1  
 C2  
 C3 
C4 
 
Politician  Po1  
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4.0 Findings: Reflections on the construction 
and interpretation of the law  
 
Reflecting on how the law was constructed and how it might be interpreted 
is relevant in attempting to better understand the law in practice. For 
instance, such reflection can draw attention to issues that appear to have 
been contentious and indicate possible practices that might be against the 
spirit of the law even if they might be compliant with the letter of the law. 
Regarding the issue of interpretation, industry guidelines are a particularly 
worthy consideration. As the UK law was substantially meant to be a 
transposition of an EU directive in a form as close as possible to a one-to-
one correspondence with the directive, issues in the drafting of the law may 
be mainly located at the EU level (an on-going and future concern of our 
research). At the same time, there was substantial lobbying by industry not 
only at the EU level but also in the UK context. Some of the latter lobbying 
tended to repeat the concerns expressed at the EU level, while some 
reflected concerns about those aspects of the law that the UK government 
had discretion to legislate upon at State level (including penalties for non-
compliance and the precise timing of the law’s introduction). 
 
Brief overview of concerns of the industry lobby (UK 
law) 
 
There were a number of views expressed by corporate lobbyists in relation 
to the UK law when it was in process that one might consider amounted to 
challenges to the intended function of the law. Such views were evident in 
corporate responses to the UK government consultation in 2014, prior to 
the Regulations being accepted into UK law. These included the following 
views. Firstly, there was a concern that mandatory public disclosure 
requirements can become a ‘tick box’ exercise rather than enabling a clear 
articulation of information useful to an intended user. Secondly, concern 
was expressed about the costs involved, which some deemed significant. 
Many requested more time in which to meet the compliance requirements.  
Reference was made to the cost of electronic filing. And several sought a 
degree of leniency in respect of proposed penalties. Thirdly, also related to 
the point about costs, there was concern about a disproportionate burden 
being placed on UK (and EU) companies so that company competitiveness 
would be reduced. In this regard, some pointed to the need to monitor what 
was happening with S1504 of the US Dodd-Frank Act, which at the time of 
the consultation was being reconsidered after a law suit, mounted by 
representatives of the US extractives industry, challenged its operation. A 
reduction in competitiveness was portrayed as potentially being counter-
productive in terms of the underlying aims of transparency – where 
investment was linked positively to economic development it might be 
reduced or curtailed. Some referred to finding themselves in conflict with 
host-government laws and confidentiality obligations - where there is a 
conflict, the law is quite clear that companies cannot be excused. Some 
even expressed concern about the safety of their staff.  These arguments 
are well known to civil society, which has worked hard to counter them. 
17 
 
And, of course, the US experience with Dodd-Frank alone is indicative of 
the corporate opposition (at least in the US context) to the kind of 
transparency provisions at stake. What is of interest in relation to the EU 
and UK laws is that in spite of the concerns expressed, the laws were 
passed. And in the case of the UK, the statutory instrument was passed 
earlier than the targeted deadline date. This achievement can be seen as a 
base on which to build. And it may also suggest that the industry lobby may 
include significant forces prepared to acknowledge a space for negotiation, 
for something workable and clear, rather than being in a position of absolute 
opposition. It might be acknowledged that a number of companies in the 
relevant industries have referred to supporting the law’s intentions. While 
caveats typically follow such commitment, this is a degree better than 
outright explicit opposition. 
 
Some comments on the UK Law and Industry 
Guidance 
 
One observation about the law itself that may be made is that the language 
of the law is not as simple or as straightforward as one might have assumed 
it would be given the basic principle it is ostensibly trying to enact (with the 
rationale suggesting the case for transparency of as many payments as 
possible into governments, central and local, that an entity within the scope 
of the law should be aware of as arising from its operations – so long as 
multiple counts of those payments are avoided).  Off the record comments 
were made to us by three interviewees, that EU law is often drafted quite 
vaguely to secure agreement across the different countries of the EU. 
Further, there will be a limit to how much EU law can be made clearer in 
transposition given the concern that it must be as far as possible transposed 
into UK law on a one-to-one basis. An off the record industry view was that 
the law was far from clear. At the same time, expert opinion deemed the 
UK law clear enough to a lawyer and indeed in this context the view was 
upheld that the law clearly reflected its rationale. Specifically, here, we 
consider evidence gathered in relation to: De minimis provisions; audit and 
assurance; forthcoming consultations; project level payments and the 
definition of ‘substantially interconnected’; joint ventures; and the cost of 
reporting payments to governments.  
 
De minimis 
 
Including size criteria in the law may make forms of avoidance and evasion 
easier, through some kinds of disaggregation of payments. At the same 
time, civil servants and industry representatives emphasized that in their 
view the size criteria were set very low so that many were brought into the 
law – with the relative burden of compliance on smaller companies being 
significant. 
 
Audit and assurance 
 
There is no provision that the RPG be audited. This absence was for some 
explained by costs, which were argued by some companies to be potentially 
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significant. One commentator felt that because the RPG was prepared 
separate from the accounts it would not necessarily be seen as a report to 
be audited (another suggested that this justified the lack of audit). Here, it 
can be noted that the international auditing standards refer to forms of 
assurance that stop short of a full audit. Notably, the concept of ‘limited 
assurance’ is recognised in these standards14. The Regulations (and Chapter 
10), however, do not require limited assurance. Further, there is no 
requirement that the RPG need to be reconciled to company accounting 
information in annual reports. Since the latter is audited, such reconciliation 
would potentially increase assurance. 
 
Forthcoming government consultations 
 
That both the UK and EU laws are to be reviewed relatively soon is worth 
reflecting upon. It is scheduled for times arguably when it will be much too 
early to assess these laws, as was mentioned by interviewees. The early 
implementation of the law in the UK is attributed by many to UK 
government enthusiasm – although some simply saw it as the UK, at least 
in respect of this law, ‘following the EU rules’ (while others seriously lagged 
this lead). Further, it allows the UK government to better influence the EU 
review (a view the efficacy of which might not be as strong post-Brexit). 
The early review also provides an early opportunity for the most negative 
of judgements. It should be stressed that amongst interviewees no one 
(including from industry) expressed the view that the law should be 
completely abandoned, even in the wake of the decision taken by the Trump 
administration. Nevertheless, there should be concern to make the 
strongest defence and promotion of the law, albeit with suggested 
modifications thereto.  
 
Project level payments and ‘substantially interconnected’  
 
An interesting aspect of the initial EU law, which was appreciated by UK 
legal counsel, was the way in which the construct ‘substantially 
interconnected’ is explained in the EU Law (Article 41). Basically, it is not 
explained – which means it is a matter of legal interpretation, and counsel 
advises a range of interpretations are possible, from narrow to broad, if 
there is the question of reflecting the spirit or substance of the Accounting 
Directive. The construct ‘substantially interconnected’ is illustrated in the 
pre-amble to the Directive (it is in Recital 45). This may reflect that the 
term was controversial – in the interests of getting the Directive passed 
within a parliamentary timeframe, putting something in the pre-amble may 
have been seen as an effective compromise. Interestingly, the illustration 
from Recital 45 has been taken into the main body of the UK Regulations 
at pp. 5-7, which raises questions about this aspect of the law. 
 
The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers’ Guidance (IOGP 
Guidance) was drafted subsequent to a working group that included the 
International Council on Mining and Metals and the BIS (now BEIS). The 
latter were keen to encourage industry guidelines and reviewed the IOGP 
guidance although in the end stepped back from endorsing it, as this may 
                                      
14 International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000. 
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have been seen as a controversial move. Civil society representatives were 
disappointed by the consultative process and felt that there was a relative 
failure to take into account their feedback. 
 
The Industry Guidance is deemed contentious by legal counsel in its 
interpretation of the construct ‘substantially interconnected’. Following 
Industry Guidance, companies might disingenuously aggregate payments 
in their reports to avoid providing project level data (although clearly the 
guidance is not directly advocating that). The letter of the law may permit 
this although such practices arguably contravene the spirit of the law and 
indeed a reasonable interpretation of the law. 
 
Regarding project level aggregation, there are a number of issues that need 
to be appreciated, including perhaps in relation to future negotiations over 
the law. The rationale for project level reporting is appreciated quite widely. 
For instance, civil servants understood this rationale, even if they had an 
appreciation of it also implying costly practices. Industry representatives 
also saw the point about project level reporting – the concern to bring 
attention to areas within countries and their local populations – but they 
expressed concern about how often project level reporting would be helpful 
in practice. Perhaps a significant amount of project level reporting in 
practice may not be identifying the sorts of geographical area that civil 
society want to bring a focus to. Against that, civil society representatives 
may set examples of cases where project level reporting has been very 
helpful or promises to be, for example in identifying payments for licences 
or production sharing payments. The cost issue is here deemed a significant 
one – in that it is seen as costly by industry, it was highlighted in interviews 
with preparers and industry representatives that these types of allocations 
may not be easily obtained from existing systems and their creations does 
require the allocation of tax and finance resources which can amount to a 
significant cost to business. And even with goodwill on the part of preparers, 
there is an amount of subjectivity and complexity involved in apportioning 
financial flows to particular fields or projects. In regard to tax payments, 
this may work more straightforwardly for field by field taxes but regarding 
corporate tax, reporting systems are not set up to stream these liabilities 
out on a project by project basis and neither are taxes levied this way. 
Evidence from interviewees and our review of the RPG suggests that 
companies will take their own view on apportionment which may result in a 
lack of consistency. And if fields are under the sea, there are difficulties 
allocating these to any on shore sites even before further complex 
apportionment is made. For some, civil society campaigners and industry 
representatives interviewed, the inconsistencies in practice arising from the 
law as it is (and perhaps it is very difficult for it to be otherwise) negates 
the value of project level reporting – even to the extent that a prominent 
civil society campaigner seriously questioned the commitment to project 
level reporting at least as it was currently done. The arbitrariness about 
how projects are aggregated may lead not only to inconsistency but also 
potentially to obfuscation, as suggested above. 
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Joint ventures 
 
Returning to the Industry Guidance, it states that payments made on behalf 
of participants in joint ventures (JVs) by the operator should be reported 
by the operator. Thus, if a joint venture (JV) project is operated by a 
company that is not subject to the Regulations or Chapter 10 and the joint 
venture is structured so that payments are made by the operator on behalf 
of the joint venture participants, no payments would be reported for the 
project (at least following the UK law or this interpretation of it). Companies 
might here evade disclosure by adjusting the payment structure employed 
by their joint ventures (although this might for some companies not be an 
especially easy thing to successfully arrange). Again, the guidance might, 
even unintentionally, be suggestive of practices against the spirit and even 
a reasonable interpretation of the law. The guidance prompted PWYP to 
express three main concerns about joint venture arrangements:  
 
1. Joint venture structures may be used to avoid certain entities or 
business vehicles falling within the scope of the regulations. 
2. Payments made to national resource companies in their capacity as 
joint venture partners may be excluded when in fact they are 
payments to governments. 
3. Payments made to operating partners under joint venture billing may 
eventually be remitted to governments. However, if the operating 
partner in the JV does not fall within the scope of Chapter 10 then 
these payments may go unreported.  
 
When interviewed on this point, a preparer, an auditor and an industry 
representative thought that it was highly unlikely that an arrangement 
would be structured with the intent of avoiding the Chapter 10 disclosures. 
Each interviewee highlighted the complex commercial arrangements which 
surround JV arrangements and noted that the commercial and risk 
spreading aspects of entering into these agreements dominate the form 
they take - some JV agreements require government approval to at least 
ostensibly ensure appropriate stewardship of assets. Whether there is a 
danger of JVs being set up to avoid the disclosures or not, it is the case that 
these structures are commonplace in oil and gas production and so the risk 
of under reported payments exists. 
 
Similar to the case of JV arrangements elaborated above, in advising on 
reporting payments to state owned companies acting as field operators, the 
Industry Guidance states that disclosure is only required when payments 
that are in-scope (and satisfy the size criteria) are distinguishable from 
other costs. Whether or not a payment is “distinguishable” may be open to 
different interpretations and may depend largely on a company’s internal 
reporting systems and so therefore may be inconsistent across the industry. 
This again might indicate practices that are against the spirit of the law and 
arguably its reasonable interpretation. 
 
Cost of the system 
 
The Industry Guidance is not written from a position opposing transparency, 
however, and indeed stresses the need to establish a common reporting 
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mechanism that is ‘user-friendly’. A key concern expressed in the guidance 
is that of the cost of the reporting system. It seems likely that the 
interpretation of substantially interconnected, the highlighting of payments 
by operators on behalf of joint venture participants and the point concerning 
distinguishable in-scope payments to state owned companies acting as field 
operators, are borne out of a concern about costs and a perceived lack of 
clarity in the law. This may be a plea for a clearer set of rules that is less 
subject to misinterpretation as well as a set of rules that are reasonable in 
the context and not excessively costly. At the same time, legal counsel is 
of the view that the law does reasonably well reflect its underlying rationale. 
This may still suggest a degree of negotiating space.  
The RPG regulations and other regulatory initiatives  
 
A further issue that exists in the discourse around the RPG is the lack of 
cohesiveness, indeed integration between the RPG Regulations and other 
regulatory initiatives (which may not be legally binding but are nevertheless 
becoming influential as initiatives backed by government or international 
bodies). This lack of cohesion was a consistent source of concern expressed 
by an auditor, a preparer and several industry representatives interviewed. 
 
The preparer we interviewed highlighted the duplication of effort required 
in order to file both EITI reports and RPG. The fact that the requirements 
for the two initiatives do not match meant additional effort and cost was 
incurred in providing two different and yet similar reports15.  
 
It is felt that this disparity may also impact the usefulness of the information 
published under the Regulations, EITI and further voluntary disclosures e.g. 
through CSR reports. This is especially the case where some or all of the 
information provided is not reconcilable to group accounts. 
 
The preparer and auditor interviewed also expressed curiosity in this 
context as to whether the RPG were used or viewed by anyone. When 
compared to EITI reports, which are third party reviewed, there was a 
feeling that these reports were prepared and filed but that there was a 
limited audience for the information. Of course, here it should be noted that 
it is the first reporting cycle for the RPG and that (aside from the legal 
backing) the RPG have some strengths over the EITI reports. But, again, 
this underlines the importance for advocates of the RPG in their current 
form or in an improved form of evidencing actual and potential usages of 
the RPG. 
 
                                      
15 A further form of country-by-country reporting has been introduced in the UK by 
The Taxes (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) (Country-by-Country Reporting) 
Regulations 2016 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/237/contents/made) 
for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016 to comply with the 
OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 13 rules, which will require 
more reports to be prepared and submitted to HMRC using similar (but nevertheless 
different) information (to be used for a slightly different purpose). Some companies 
reporting under the Regulations will also be required to report under these new 
rules. 
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There may be value in reviewing the various initiatives and seeking to 
rationalise the information requested both to minimise the cost to business 
and to avoid the issue of reconciling large volumes of similar information 
prepared on slightly different bases. An important consideration here is to 
try to ‘level up’ even while rationalising or even compromising. 
 
Legislative assurance of jurisdictional tax compliance 
 
From an economic point of view, the disclosure of payments made to 
governments provides civil society with additional information to assess the 
investment of revenues raised by governments through exploitation of 
natural resources. This is useful information for holding governments to 
account on spending. However, what this information does not disclose is 
whether the amount of taxes paid by companies is what it should have 
been, in line with the applicable local legislation. The lack of a reference 
point for assessing compliance with jurisdictional tax law means that civil 
society users are unable to judge whether governments are enforcing tax 
legislation in line with the spirit and letter of the law and whether companies 
are employing legal avoidance methods or adopting illegal tax evasion 
practices. RPG are of great relevance to know what payments are being 
made to governments. However, they are of limited use in communicating 
the reasonableness of those payments and whether such payments reflect 
what national governments should have received according to national tax 
rules.  
 
Potentially, the OECD’s introduction of a form of country-by-country 
reporting through BEPS Action 13 will complement the form of country-by-
country reporting reflected in RPG. One of the largest areas for potential 
tax avoidance by transnational corporate companies (TNCs) is the use of 
transfer pricing to shift profits intra-group from a high to a lower tax 
jurisdiction. Action 13 requires TNCs to complete a template, for each 
separate jurisdiction in which they operate, to disclose the following 
information: tax jurisdiction, related party and third-party revenues, profit 
or loss before income tax, income tax paid, income tax accrued, stated 
capital, accumulated earnings, number of employees, tangible non-cash 
assets. This information is filed with the relevant tax authority to aid them 
in assessing transfer pricing risk.  
 
The information disclosed in the templates is regarded by the OECD as 
providing sufficient information to allow tax authorities to undertake a 
transfer pricing risk assessment, although the OECD acknowledges that 
further information may be required in order to carry out a full transfer 
pricing review.16  
 
As part of the review of RPG, the segmental reporting disclosures (IFRS 8) 
of the seven sample companies reviewed in detail were examined in 
conjunction with the RPG numbers to assess whether information required 
for the BEPS Action 13 templates could be constructed. However, this 
                                      
16 OECD BEPS Final Report - Action 13 Chapter V Paragraph B5.  
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proved to be extremely difficult due to most IFRS 8 disclosures being 
prepared on an operating segment rather than a geographical basis.  
 
In addition to Action 13 developments, we learned from our interviews with 
civil society stakeholders that they strongly advocate contract 
transparency, which is increasing in the extractives sector, and legislation-
based licensing regimes. The publication of these contracts, especially 
where agreements contain a production or profit sharing clause, may have 
the potential to provide civil society with further useful information enabling 
better scrutiny of legislative adherence and enforcement at a jurisdictional 
level. 
 
5.0 Findings: Analysis of disclosures in the 
RPG and related disclosures of the sample 
 
In this section, we present our analysis of the reports under RPG regulations 
of 50 selected companies and summarise these findings in Table 3 and 
Figures 2-11. We then elaborate our analysis of Sample7 companies, as 
summarised in Table 4. Mandatory levels of disclosure are summarised in 
Appendix 2 
Company level compliance 
 
Our findings show that our sample of selected companies, incorporated in 
the UK, have complied with the statutory obligation to file a report under 
RPG regulations; companies that are not UK incorporated but listed on the 
LSE have also complied with the Regulations. As previously shown (Table 
1), companies used different reporting formats; most companies reported 
using the prescribed XML schema that outputs to CSV spreadsheets with 
few or no additional disclosures, whereas some higher profile companies 
produced an additional long PDF that includes tables explaining the different 
payments to governments and detailed information on how the Regulations 
have been interpreted, infographics and data tables, details of economic 
contributions not captured by the Regulations and in one case (BP) a 
‘limited assurance’ report. 
 
Mandatory reporting requirements under the Regulations are replicated in 
panels A-D of Table 3. Panel A shows the extent of compliance with Section 
5:1(a)-(d) of the Regulations. All 50 companies in our sample reported the 
country of the government to which payments are made.  Of the sample, 
40 (80%) companies disclose the governments to which payments are 
made, the amount paid to each government (40 companies, 80%) and the 
total amount per type of payment made to each government (39 
companies, 78%). Panel A also shows that 36 (72%) and 38 (76%) 
companies disclosed the total amount of payment made for each project 
and the total amount per type of payment made for each project, 
respectively. 
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It is important to note that, where there is no disclosure, it is unclear as to 
whether this indicated non-compliance with the regulations or simply that 
the disclosure is not relevant to the reporting entity. In a preliminary 
analysis of 23 RPG (Appendix 3), several companies did declare that they 
had ‘nothing to disclose’ regarding certain payment types, which indicates 
emergent good practice. This point informs our recommendations. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the extent of disclosure in relation to types of 
payment, evidencing reporting of: taxes levied (46 companies), fees (38) 
and royalties (31) were the most frequently disclosed types of payments 
made to governments, followed by infrastructure improvements (22) and 
production entitlements (16). However, few companies in the sample 
disclosed information about bonus payments (5) or dividends (2). 
 
The Regulations (s5:5) mandate that “the disclosure of payments must 
reflect the substance, rather than the form, of each payment, relevant 
activity or project concerned”. Only one company in our sample, BP, 
specifically referred to reflecting substance and elaborated its reporting 
obligations in the light of this requirement. This elaboration particularly 
focused upon joint ventures, stating: ‘where BP has made a payment to 
government, such payments are made in full, whether made in BP’s sole 
capacity as the operator in a joint venture’. Other companies disclosed 
similarly (if not all) by in effect reporting aspects of substance over form 
without explicitly referring to it (e.g. Shell elaborate on joint venture 
arrangements and Rio Tinto on payments to tax havens and related 
matters). The observations inform our recommendations. 
 
Finally, the Regulations (s5:6) mandate that where payments in-kind are 
made, the reporting entity must state their value and, where applicable, 
their volume, with supporting information about how the value has been 
calculated. Six companies submitting their report under RPG regulations by 
using the XML schema complied with this requirement (Table 3, Panel D).  
  
 
 
Table 3: Disclosure of Payments to Governments for 50 companies 
Note: ‘Disclosed’ means the company disclosed the relevant activity per the Regulations; ‘Not’’ means the company has stated that the activity or 
payment type per the Regulations is not relevant to the company or the company does not disclose any information about the relevant activity or 
payment type. ‘Figure’ refers to the relevant figure in this report. NS = not shown 
* A company reports zero in the report prepared, but does not mention it did not pay any as it does when it comes to other types of payments. 
**A company disclosed that payments were made but were not above the threshold, and therefore were not reported.  
  
Panel A: Content of Reports  
Mandatory Requirement Regs Disclosed Not  Partial  Figure 
Government to which payments made S5:1 (a) 40 10  Fig. 2 
The country of the government to which payments are made S5:1 (a) 50   NS 
Total amount paid to each government S5:1 (b) 40  10 Fig. 3 
Total amount per type of payment made to each government S5:1 (c) 39  11 Fig. 4 
Total amount of payment made for each project S5:1 (d) 36 6 8 Fig. 5 
Total amount per type of payment made for each project S5:1 (d) 38 6 6 Fig. 6 
Panel B: Types of payments 
Mandatory Requirement Regs Disclosed Not  Partial  Figure 
Production entitlements S2 16 34  Fig. 7 
Taxes levied S2 46 4  NS 
Royalties S2 31 18 1* Fig. 8 
Dividends S2 2 48  Fig. 9 
Bonuses S2 5 45  Fig. 10 
Fees S2 38 11 1** Fig. 11 
Infrastructure improvements S2 22 28  NS 
Panel C: Substance over form -  The Regulations, Section 5(5) 
Of the 41 companies presenting a PDF file, one company (BP) refers to the term substance over form in the report that is available online. 
Of the 29 companies presenting a CSV spreadsheet, none of the companies refer to the term substance over form. 
Panel D: Payments in kind  -  The Regulations, Section 5(6) 
Of the 41 companies presenting PDF files: 6 companies report that they have made in-kind payments, while 3 more companies include information on 
in-kind payments without clearly identifying that they have made such payments; One company claims that payments were in cash, then discloses the 
following under production entitlements: ‘This includes non-cash royalties and amounts paid in barrels of oil or gas out of the company’s working interest 
share of production in a licence. The figures disclosed are produced on an entitlement basis rather than a liftings basis and are valued at the actual price 
used to determine entitlement. Of the 6 companies, 4 state the value of payment in-kind, volume and an explanation of how the value is determined, 1 
states the value of the payment only and 1 states how the value of in-kind payment is determined only.  
Of the 29 companies presenting CSV spreadsheets, despite the fact that only one refers to payments in kind, 6 of them state the value of payments in 
kind, their volume and provide an explanation of how this value was determined. 
 
 
Quantitative analysis 
 
Compliance with the Regulations, Section 5:1 (a)-(d) 
 
All companies in our sample disclose the country of the government to which 
payments were made. As can be seen from Figure 2, 80% of the companies report 
the government to which each payment is made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 10 (20%) companies which 
did not disclose the total amount 
of payments made to each 
government were the same as 
the 10 companies in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80%
20%
Report the
government
Do not report the
government
80%
20%
Disclosed
Other
Figure 2: The government to which each payment is made 
Figure 3: Total amount of payments made to 
each government 
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Eleven companies (22%) 
did not fully disclose, of 
which: 8 disclosed the 
total but did not specify 
the government; 2 
provided a breakdown of 
the payments but do not 
provide the total; and 1 
company that did not 
specify the government 
but did provide a 
breakdown but not a total 
amount. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Six of the companies (12%) do 
not provide any project level 
information, while 8 (16%) of 
them fall under the ‘other’ 
category which includes a 
company that provides mine 
names instead of project names 
(although the law permits 
companies to report at an entity 
level, when a project level cannot 
be achieved), and 7 companies 
that do provide a breakdown but 
do not provide a total. 
 
 
 
 
 
78%
22%
Disclosed
Other
Figure 4: Total amount per type of payment 
made to each government 
Figure 5: Total amount of payments made for 
each project 
72%
12%
16%
Disclosed
Not disclosed
Other
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The 12% of companies that do 
not provide any information that 
relates to the total amount per 
type of payments made for each 
project, includes the same 
companies that did not report 
any project related payments 
(Figure 5).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the 50 companies analysed, 46 (92%) paid some form of taxes levied (Table 
3, Panel B). 
 
The results differ when it comes to the other types of payments that companies 
are required to disclose (Figures 7 to 11). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Production entitlements payment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32%
68%
Have paid
Have not paid/do not
mention any
information
76%
12%
12%
Disclosed
Not disclosed
Other
Figure 6: Total amount per type of payment made 
for each project 
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The 2% in Figure 8, 
represents a company that 
reports zero in the report 
prepared, but does not 
mention it did not pay any as 
it does when it comes to 
other types of payments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of the 2 companies that 
disclose dividends 
(representing 4% of the 
sample in Figure 10), one of 
them mentions that these 
dividends are aggregated 
with other items. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Royalties payment 
62%
36%
2%
Have paid
Have not paid/do not
mention any
information
Other
Figure 9: Bonuses payment 
Figure 10: Dividends payment 
10%
90%
Have paid
Have not paid/do
not mention any
information
4%
96%
Have paid
Have not paid/do not
mention any
information
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When it comes to fees 
payments, one company 
(2%) did disclose that 
payments were made but 
were not above the 
threshold, and therefore 
were not reported.  
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure analysis 
 
In depth analysis performed on the RPG in connection with company accounts and 
CSR reports highlighted several areas of interest. Table 4 provides a summary of 
findings which are expanded upon in subsequent sections and which inform the 
recommendations of the report. 
 
 
Table 4 – Other disclosures 
  Yes No 
IFRS 8 – Geographical disclosures provided 7 0 
IFRS 8 – Geographical disclosures of taxation 
charge provided  
1 6 
Mineral properties note identifying 
aggregated areas where extraction takes 
place 
6 1 
Mineral properties note identifying all 
individual countries where extraction takes 
place 
4 3 
Countries in investment note where there are 
“operations” all represented in the RPG 
1 6 
Taxation note – reconciled to the report under 
RPG regulations 
1 6 
Disclosure of any provisions relating 
specifically to uncertain tax positions 
3 4 
Figure 11: Fees payment 
76%
22%
2%
Have paid
Have not paid/do not
mention any
information
Other
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Joint operations 
 
A review of the RPG in conjunction with the accounts, with particular attention to 
joint operation notes, highlighted that this is an opaque area. Some groups 
disclosed in supplementary notes to their reports under RPG regulations the JVs 
which are excluded from the scope of their chapter 10 reporting requirements 
however where there was no such disclosure it was not possible to discern which 
JV partnerships in which territories may be excluded from the reports. 
 
The following excerpts from Royal Dutch Shell Plc’s 2015 Report17 is illustrative: 
 
“This report includes payments made by Royal Dutch Shell Plc and its subsidiary 
undertakings (Shell). Payments made by entities over which Shell has joint control 
are excluded from this report”  
 
“When Shell makes a payment directly to a government arising from a project, 
regardless of whether Shell is the operator, the full amount paid is disclosed even 
where Shell as the operator is proportionally reimbursed by its non-operating 
venture partners through a partner billing process (cash-call).  
 
When a national oil company is the operator of a project to whom Shell makes a 
reportable payment which is distinguishable in the cash-call, it is included in this 
Report.” 
 
This explanation of Shell’s interpretation of the Regulations highlights the potential 
for payments to go unreported.  
 
From the above, where Shell does not have control over an entity, reliance is on 
the party with control to report payments. This in turn relies on that party being 
within the regulations, which is uncertain indeed from the limited information 
contained in the accounts and from the RPG it is not always possible to discern 
who the operating partners of unreported JVs are.  
 
Shell reports its payments to government made as an operator, regardless of 
reimbursement, thus eliminating this issue for non-controlling parties with joint 
operatorship in Shell operated assets. If all operators were to undertake to provide 
this detail this may capture the majority of payments made. However, this relies 
on non-operators not reporting payments as to do so would result in some 
payments being double counted. One way forward suggested here is that the 
group could be made responsible for checking whether a non-operator reported 
payments or not to ensure that payments are reported but not double counted.  
 
                                      
17 http://www.shell.com/sustainability/transparency/revenues-for-
governments/_jcr_content/par/textimage.stream/1460962925009/43a62e840a312580b
7a030a0b6719d720a03afb774d5edf22bc8f30914609748/shell-report-payments-to-
governments-2015-18042016.pdf 
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The final paragraph highlights that payments made to national oil companies are 
disclosed in the Report where they can be distinguished in cash-calls (payments 
made by non-operating partners to operators to cover joint costs). This is a 
positive commitment to disclose such payments however there is an underlying 
issue, which is that these payments may not be distinguishable and there may be 
certain payments which arguably could be payments to governments but may not 
fall within the definition of such within the regulations. 
 
To summarise, this is an area of significant complexity. No evidence was found of 
companies altering structures to avoid disclosing payments however the issues 
highlighted from Shell’s Report were common across the sample. Furthermore, 
the lack of clarity over JV reporting in general and specifically classification of 
payments to national resource companies was highlighted as an issue by the 
preparer and the auditor interviewed. 
 
In this area, as we note below, it is recommended that some clarifying guidance 
should be issued by BEIS in order to ensure consistency. 
Disparity from accounts 
 
When analysing the RPG, it became quickly apparent that for the most part, and 
certainly where companies had international operations, there was little or no 
possibility of reconciling the payments reported back to figures in the accounts for 
the same period. The figures do not reconcile for several reasons including: 
 
- The RPG figures are prepared on a cash paid basis, whereas the tax charge 
and any other identifiable tax figures in the accounts are reported on an 
accruals basis (the “accruals difference”). 
- The RPG figures include production levies, tariff payments, royalties and 
production based taxes. Most of these are unlikely to appear in the tax 
charge and may not be separately disclosed anywhere in the accounts. 
- The tax charge in the accounts will include liabilities incurred in relation to 
activities which fall out with the scope of the Regulations e.g. “downstream” 
activities such as storage, transportation, refinement and sale.   
 
The first point is possible to overcome, to an extent, by referring to the cash flow 
statement, or where no cash flow statement is prepared by comparing the closing 
tax creditor to the opening creditor adjusted for the current year movement. This 
gives an approximation of the tax paid but is not exact as the movement may 
include accounting adjustments and the result may still be compromised by the 
inclusion of tax payments not within the scope of the Regulations. 
 
The Regulations, were not meant to be a supplementary appendage of the 
Accounts and so this lack of consistency is not surprising. Nor is it a reflection on 
the quality of reports provided by companies as the companies analysed, for the 
most part, have complied at least with the minimum obligations of the 
Regulations. 
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The reason the lack of cohesion is an issue is that it potentially impairs the 
reliability and comparability of the information. As stated previously the RPG 
provide information unavailable elsewhere, which despite being a step forward 
does leave users unable to verify the information against other publicly available 
sources. The obvious source of publicly available information for users to turn to 
for corroboration in this scenario is the accounts, which have the benefit of being 
independently audited, however the differences noted above make reconciliation 
extremely difficult and so will provide little assurance as to the accuracy of the 
RPG and furthermore may cause confusion if users are not familiar with the 
difference in basis of preparation between the two reports, compromising the 
comparability of the information. 
 
Rio Tinto, in their 2015 Report under RPG regulations, produced a table of 
reconciliation showing the main differences between the figures in the Report and 
the Group’s accounts. The reconciliation adjusts for tax charges arising from equity 
accounted investments, deferred tax and the accruals difference. This 
reconciliation is a useful step in allowing users to contextualise the tax paid by the 
company within the wider company performance and arguably gives users some 
assurance as to the accuracy of the figures in the Report by being able to reconcile 
them back to audited accounts. 
 
No other detailed reports, reviewed as part of this project, provided a detailed 
reconciliation to accounts. It is however felt that the addition of this type of 
reconciliation would be of benefit to users for the reasons highlighted above. It is 
recommended that the requirement to produce a reconciliation should be 
incorporated into the legislation and that this is something which should be 
highlighted as part of the BEIS consultation.    
 
The question of whether reconciliations would be a useful addition to the RPG and 
whether preparing reconciliations would be an achievable exercise for preparers 
was raised with our interviewees. Concern was expressed by the auditor, the 
preparer and the representatives of industry that additional administration and 
the complexity of some fiscal rules, especially around production sharing, would 
make this a burdensome exercise for preparers. These concerns would have to be 
balanced against the benefit of the additional clarity provided by reconciliations 
and so it is suggested that any pro forma reconciliation should have scope to be 
amended to take account of individual circumstances as long as it addresses the 
three main reconciling differences highlighted above e.g. the accruals difference, 
items not expressly disclosed in the accounts and tax charges arising from 
activities not captured under the Regulations. 
Integrated business models 
 
It was observed when reviewing the seven companies producing detailed reports 
to accompany the report under RPG regulations that several entities were included 
in the investment note in the accounts of some of these companies (their primary 
activity was noted as ‘operations’). And these companies did not appear to be 
represented in the RPG or at least their country of establishment was not a 
jurisdiction for which payments were reported. It may be that no reportable 
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payments were made in these jurisdictions. However, the lack of disclosure may 
also be a result of these operations not falling within the scope of the legislation. 
 
The legislation requires companies carrying out extractive activities to report 
payments and extractive activities are defined by the legislation as follows: ‘…any 
activity involving the exploration, prospection, discovery, development, and 
extraction of minerals, oil, natural gas deposits or other materials’. The definition 
is applied to individual ‘concerns’ e.g. on a company by company basis. As the 
definition requires a companies’ activities to directly relate to primary extraction 
of minerals in order to fall within the scope of Chapter 10 this means that 
companies carrying out supporting activities ‘downstream’ of the primary 
extraction (‘secondary activities’) are excluded from the RPG reporting 
requirements. It is understood that the regulations are not designed to capture 
secondary activities however mining and oil and gas production are often carried 
out by fully integrated groups of companies who are able to perform all of the 
necessary steps in the process of mineral exploitation, from exploration and 
prospecting to eventual wholesale or retail of the product. The integrated approach 
provides groups with the opportunity to shift profits through the value chain via 
intra-group transactions as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
The shifting of profits will be checked or limited to a degree by transfer pricing 
rules, however where these are ineffective or not strictly enforced the potential 
for profit shifting will exist. Primary extractive activities are territorially bound and 
are often subject to higher rates of taxation than secondary activities. Groups 
therefore have an incentive to shift profits down the production chain in order to 
achieve a tax arbitrage. 
 
The definition of extractive industries in Chapter 10 does not currently take 
account of the integrated business models employed by a number of the groups 
involved in mineral production. The regulations adopt a form over substance 
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approach which treats intra-group companies as separate commercial enterprises. 
This ignores the reality which is that companies within a group form part of one 
coherent commercial enterprise. By employing profit shifting techniques designed 
to achieve a tax arbitrage groups operating in extractive sectors will also 
potentially present a distorted picture of the payments they make to governments 
under the current RPG regime. This is because taxes levied on profits earned by 
secondary service providers through intra-group receipts will not be reported. This 
means users of RPG reports will not be able to discern for individual projects or 
operations in a specific territory the full amount of tax paid and to which 
government the tax was paid. The above suggests the need for a modification of 
the law, considered in recommendations (subter). 
 
Analysis of semi-structured stakeholder interviews 
 
Having analysed the RPG of the companies in our sample, a number of interesting 
findings emerged. These findings, together with observations made in the 
literature and from reflecting on the construction of the Regulations, were used to 
further develop an initial set of questions to guide semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders and constituencies. The interviewees were identified through the 
researchers’ and PWYP contacts (see Table 2). Interviewees were consulted on a 
variety of issues, including: civil society and calls for transparency; development 
and introduction of transparency legislation; industry lobbying and guidelines; the 
de minimis threshold; audit and assurance; project aggregation; joint ventures; 
government consultations. Relevant and interesting observations from these 
interviews are used throughout Sections 4 and 5 of this report. 
 
Three interviewee transcripts are here analysed in depth, showing, for example, 
how these interviewees’ perceptions informed our 11 recommendations, 
presented in the executive summary.  
 
The three chosen interviewees represented three distinct stakeholder groups who 
have been involved in negotiations to interpret and implement Chapter 10 
requirements into UK legislation, being:  a legislator (LG); a civil society 
campaigner for corporate transparency (CT); and an extractive industry 
representative (IR). 
UK review of the legislation and audit requirement  
 
At the time of writing, BEIS were about to launch their review of the Regulations, 
mandated to be completed during 2017. When asked about the possible focus of 
the forthcoming review, LG expected inclusion of:  
 
… questions about how was this [the Regulations] implementation, 
what were the costs like, is this making a difference, what do … 
investors think, civil society [think] – what are [users] doing with the 
information, is it making a difference, how are [users] using this in 
terms of going forward. … questions about - how much further should 
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Europe go, what additional requirements might there [be]. 
 
However, when asked about enhancing credibility of the RPG by requiring a degree 
of external assurance, LG did not think anyone had “suggested audit”.  
 
The civil society campaigner made clear that they regarded the review as an 
important opportunity to feedback on the operation of the legislation thus far. CT 
highlighted three key issues which they wished to address through the 
consultation: (i) interpretation by reporting entities of the term “substantively 
interconnected” so as to allow projects to be aggregated on a wide scale, thus 
reducing the transparency of project-by-project reporting; (ii) the need to include 
commodity trading of extractive products within the legislation; and (iii) payments 
being made through joint ventures potentially being excluded or misreported as a 
result of the drafting in the legislation.  
 
The representative from industry expressed concern that the review is taking place 
too early, after only one year of reporting, meaning that respondents will have 
“limited evidence … on which they can make high quality recommendations”. 
Although commending the efforts of BEIS in communicating the requirements of 
the legislation to UK registered companies. IR felt that non-UK companies listed 
on the LSE, who comply with the Transparency Directive, had not been adequately 
informed about the Regulations, stating:   
 
 
“I think it needs to be mentioned, the good quality of BIS’s efforts to 
communicate the requirements in the consultation that went through, 
which meant that companies in the UK had no reason to feel unaware. 
Some of them were unaware. But if they were monitoring the 
regulatory obligations, they should have known. The same isn’t true for 
UK listed companies. Some of them already knew because they are UK 
based. I think the communication for those does not include Russian 
companies and others, communication with those was non-existent, 
nothing was done to reach out to them. They all found out in the wrong 
way, they all found out in a way that caught them by surprise.” 
 
Arguably, for these non-UK companies, the quality of their RPG disclosures may 
have suffered and thus the quality of any recommendations made as part of a 
review and based upon their first yearly reports may suffer. 
 
IR expressed concern that instances of reporting in the first round, which may not 
accurately reflect industry’s intentions, given the lack of experience and evidence 
available to draw on for the first year of reporting may be ceased upon and unfairly 
highlighted as being of a poor standard and may, understandably, be used by 
campaigners to lobby for changes to the legislation. IR felt it would be more logical 
to have the review further down the line when industry had had a chance to settle 
into the new regulations and build up to a level of best practice. 
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Substantially interconnected  
 
The interviewees were asked about project level reporting and the definition of 
project within the legislation. Specific attention was paid to the term ‘substantially 
interconnected’, relating to projects, which if they meet this definition can be 
reported in aggregate. This term has been brought into the main body of the UK 
legislation despite only being included in the pre-amble of the EU Directive.  
 
The legislator was of the view, reflecting on the fact that law is an interpretation, 
that inclusion of the term was unlikely to have been “let’s put that in, it will make 
it difficult”, and more likely it: 
 
“… was [probably] done to try and help people to understand what was 
meant because the recitals, you’re right, are not legally binding, but 
the recitals will … offer an explanation to what the body of the law 
means. So, when you read them together, you should see more of the 
whole picture.  …  that would have been helpful ...”  
 
The view of civil society however is that this part of the legislation is poorly drafted. 
CT felt that the legislation was originally intended to require contract-by-contract 
reporting as this is what had been campaigned for by civil society groups. 
However, after consultation with industry it was agreed that in some instances 
contract-by-contract reporting would be onerous and so a concession was made 
to allow companies to aggregate contracts where they constituted a single project. 
It is felt however that the wording in the legislation is too vague and allows too 
wide an interpretation of project aggregation. In CT’s view: 
 
“… civil societies’ position is …. for a company to lump projects together 
for the purpose of reporting then those projects need to be not only 
geographically and operationally integrated, they also need to have 
substantially similar terms. Geographically AND operationally AND 
have substantially similar terms - three criteria need to be all met.”   
 
CT argued further that the drafting of the legislation was too vague and enabled 
project aggregation beyond the intention of the law. CT emphasised that: 
 
“For the purpose of paragraph (5)18, “substantially interconnected” 
means forming a set of operationally and geographically integrated 
contracts, licences, leases or concessions or related agreements with 
substantially similar terms that are signed with a government, giving 
rise to payment liabilities.”19 
 
It is the view of CT that the legislation should be worded more tightly e.g.: 
 
                                      
18 If agreements of the kind referred to in the definition of “project” are substantially 
interconnected, those agreements are treated for the purposes of these Regulations as a 
single project. 
19 Regulation 2 Paragraph 6 The Reports on Payments to Governments Regulations 2014. 
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“For the purpose of paragraph (5), “substantially interconnected” 
means forming a set of operationally and geographically integrated 
contracts, licences, leases or concessions with substantially similar 
terms that are signed with a government, giving rise to payment 
liabilities.” 
 
This would make aggregation of projects possible only where operations were 
genuinely integrated and would be closer to contract-by-contract reporting. 
 
CT highlighted the issue in practice by providing examples of some companies 
which have reported projects on an aggregated basis which relate to a very wide 
geographical area, examples cited include, the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska. These 
“projects” may comprise of hundreds of different licences or concessions and may 
be operated entirely independently at a considerable geographical distance from 
each other, but under the provisions of the legislation can be aggregated as a 
single project due to their having “substantially similar terms” e.g. being operated 
under licences issued by the same government body. 
 
CT expressed a concern that this type of aggregation seriously impacts the 
usefulness of the information. 
 
Contrary to the views of CT, IR expressed scepticism about the value of project 
reporting at all. IR felt that the aim of the legislation as set out originally by the 
governments involved, referring back to government interactions with industry 
during translation of Chapter 10 into UK law, is to hold individual governments to 
account over payments they receive for extraction of natural resources. IR 
expressed the opinion that project level data would be of minimal use in achieving 
this aim and may only be relevant for a small subset of operations. Furthermore, 
IR was critical of the way the legislation is drafted. In response to the question, is 
the legislation clear on what a project is? IR expressed the following opinion: 
 
“No, it’s not, because people don’t know the definition of projects [the 
definition in the legislation] was not what a company or anyone within 
business would understand as or would call a “project”.” 
Joint venture operators  
 
This area was highlighted as enormously important by CT who regard the lack of 
guidance as to the appropriate way to report payments made indirectly to 
governments through JV operators as a “glaring omission” from the legislation. CT 
stated that transparency campaigners want companies to report payments made 
through JVs on a proportionate basis regardless of whether these are made 
directly to governments. CT expressed:  
 
“This is huge, this is a key thing and again this is the sticking point that 
civil society want to see amendments on [in the Regulations]. It almost 
beggars belief … the whole industry is structured on JVs, some projects 
are just one company sure but sometimes that one company is an 
incorporated JV, it gets a bit technical but anyway you get all of these 
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JVs. So this idea that the company says “we’re in the JV, and we do 
have a contract that requires us to make payments to the government, 
but we’re not going to disclose them and the reason we’re not going to 
disclose them is that we don’t actually make them to the government, 
we pay them to the operator of the project and the operator makes the 
payment on our behalf so we’re not going to report”... This is, I would 
say bigger [than project aggregation] because in terms of the 
payments that are not going to be reported, that are going 
unreported…. There must be hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands.” 
 
By contrast, IR expressed the view that the legislation in this area is clear and 
does not require companies to report payments they do not make directly to 
governments. When questioned as to the drafting of the law in this area, IR stated 
that: 
 
“The law is very plain… look... if you don’t pay it why would anyone 
make any assumptions that you should be required to report something 
that you don’t pay? ... there was no ambiguity about the law or its 
intention” 
 
When questioned about the debates that took place at the time when the 
legislation (EU Directive) was drafted, IR commented that this issue attracted 
attention but that the debate could have been more informed had there been 
better understanding of the legal composition and standing of JV agreements. 
 
Implementation, compliance and reporting non-compliance  
 
The legislator highlighted that government does not proactively check for 
instances of non-compliance, stating: 
 
“… there is no requirement on government to actually scrutinise the 
returns in any way… The requirement is for a third party or for 
something else, to bring any anomalies to the attention of Companies 
House or whoever …” 
 
The legislator perceived that implementation of the regulations had been 
straightforward and companies had disclosed “the information they have been 
required to put out”. LG elaborated: 
 
“… but [the government] would not know if they have left out 
information. But I am sure someone would. PWYP would have been on 
the phone saying, you know Shell have not produced this, or BP have 
not produced that, because … they are crawling over the returns.” 
 
Indeed, LG was not aware of companies needing help from government to 
implement the Regulations, although LG recognised that some companies may 
have gone to their country-specific governmental ambassadors to ask for 
clarification where needed.  
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CT confirmed that campaigners in civil society were reviewing the reports and 
engaging with companies to understand the information. CT also informed us that 
one campaign group was in the process of producing a handbook aimed at 
promoting the use of the information by civil society users and improving 
understanding of the data. 
 
Usefulness of RPG and reconciliation to annual accounts 
 
When being alerted to the fact that most RPG could not be linked back to audited 
financial information, LG expressed surprise at: 
 
 
… the fact that [the RPG] are not reconciled back to the accounts [and 
this] is quite an interesting point …. maybe that is a failing.  
 
The legislator intimated that not being able to reconcile back to the audited 
accounts questions the usefulness of the RPG, emphasising: 
 
That is one of the questions [that should be] put in the review, how 
useful is the information that’s coming out. Maybe … change it to ‘how 
does this align with the rest of the accounting information’. I mean all 
we have done is we have implemented what we were required to from 
Europe. I don’t think we were ever asked to try and link it to anything 
else.  
 
CT confirmed that campaigners have used companies’ annual reports and 
accounts in the past; specifically, to compare geographical operating segments 
identified in the disclosures to the accounts to projects reported in the RPG. 
Marked difference in the level of detail companies provide in the accounts 
compared to RPG have been noted in the course of this comparison. Generally, it 
was felt that the accounts provided much more granular detail about projects, 
albeit not specifically related to payments made to governments.  
 
In terms of widening the legislation to bring into scope a more comprehensive 
range of extractives companies’ operations and to some extent align the reports 
to the accounts, the legislator was aware of “PWYP pushing for commodity trading” 
disclosures to be included in future amendments to the Regulations.  
 
This was also an area picked up on by CT, who confirmed that campaigners within 
civil society viewed the issue of commodity trading as important and saw its 
omission from the legislation as an area of concern as payments made at this 
stage are potentially very large and were viewed as opaque and potentially subject 
to corruption.   
 
When questioned about the usefulness of the reports IR was of the opinion that it 
is too early to make any sort of meaningful judgement. IR did however state that 
they had seen no evidence so far of positive usage of this information. It was IR’s 
view that these Regulations form only part of a wider solution to the problem of 
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the resource curse and in of themselves the numbers reported in the RPG are of 
limited use. 
 
 
Integrated with other transparency initiatives 
 
In relation to EITI, although countries sign up to EITI voluntarily, once the 
jurisdictional commitment is made, EITI reporting, is essentially coercive. The 
legislator perceived this situation being less than ideal for industry, explaining:  
 
… I think [what] industry would like to see is … the requirements being 
exactly the same between the two, because they are reporting twice 
which is absolutely crazy. … I don’t know where civil society are on 
that, … there should be moves, whether it be in Europe or EITI to align 
the two… raising EITI to the accounting directive, then that would be 
acceptable. 
 
CT expressed some concern over the position in the US regarding section 1504 of 
the Dodd Frank Act and expressed a view that EITI as well as other initiatives 
aimed at increasing transparency in the extractives sector, for example in 
Australia and South Africa are all important parts of a wider global movement to 
improve the standard of transparency reporting.   
 
IR was of the opinion that the differences in regulations are not a major concern 
for companies although they may cause problems for users of the reports who are 
seeking to reconcile the different data sets: 
 
“For the company, it wouldn’t be too difficult. I mean there is potential 
for differences [between EITI and Chapter 10] because the rules are 
different, the MSG [EITI multi stakeholder group] in Azerbaijan or in 
any of the other countries will have determined the type of payments 
that they want to disclose, the reporting period might not be 12 
months, maybe it’s the country’s financial year which ends in March, it 
will be in the currency that they choose (very often the local currency), 
it will be setting a materiality threshold as appropriate from their point 
of view. So, there can be differences but company records are such 
that this is the least of their problem…from a company point of view 
that might be an irritation, most companies have good, sufficient 
systems to do that. The users might not find it easy to understand why 
the two reports are different figures if that were the case but the 
companies will have the underlying data to say ‘we can use that data 
to produce that report’.”  
Enhancing transparency in the sector, producing user friendly reports and 
additional narrative disclosures 
 
CT was able to provide several examples of reports which had been used by 
transparency campaigners to identify potential anomalies in payments reported 
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by companies. Transparency campaigners were, at the time of discussion, seeking 
to engage with companies to better understand potential issues which had been 
identified. This work was going on at a global level through networks of civil society 
organisations many of which are based in resource rich countries. 
 
The Open Government Partnership between government and civil society includes 
the following three deliverables, being: observance of EITI; implementation of EU 
Chapter 10; and disclosure of transparency information in a machine-readable 
way. The legislator described the: 
 
… numerous meetings between industry and civil society, to come up 
with a schema which everybody has to fill in and then make sure that 
all the information that comes out, they can cut it as they want it, so 
they can do a nice pie chart with it, they can do graphs … so the idea 
is, and this is a particular question for the review, is that the schema 
was easy to use, easy to understand, are civil society getting the right 
information from it. 
 
It was observed during the disclosure analysis presented earlier in this report, that 
companies present RPG using different formats, with some companies disclosing 
additional narrative information to explain the disclosures and/or how they have 
implemented the legislation. One company used narrative disclosures to direct 
readers to other company reports where more holistic sustainability information 
can be found, bemoaning the restricted vision of the Regulations. The legislators 
expressed disappointment that “they have actually done [interpreted] it very 
literally” in this regard. 
 
CT highlighted some areas of good practice where some companies had explained 
the basis of preparation of RPG, specifically in this instance in relation to reporting 
payments made indirectly through JV operators on a proportionate basis. This 
additional level of disclosure allowed campaigners to make better use of the 
information and enabled positive engagement with more forward-thinking 
companies to discuss best practice. 
Conclusion on three in-depth interviews 
 
Analysis of the three stakeholder interviews highlighted a number of issues worth 
of attention with regards to the composition of the legislation, including a number 
of issues where there is a potential disparity of views between the different 
stakeholder groups, namely:  
 
• Contrasting perceptions of concern regarding interpretation of 
‘substantially interconnected’ were evident between CT and IR. 
• The issue of payments made indirectly to governments through joint 
venture operators. 
• The usefulness of project-by-project reporting. 
• Integration of Chapter 10 with other transparency initiatives. 
 
There are also however areas of agreement, where motivations may differ but 
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there is agreement that the legislation is either suitable or could benefit from more 
clarification: 
 
• Interviewees agreed that the definition of ‘project’ is unclear, 
although views differ as to how useful project-by-project reporting 
is, stakeholders agree that the definition at present is unsuitable as 
it does not match industries definition of a project and it does not 
provide the granularity of data anticipated by transparency 
campaigners. 
 
6.0 Conclusions and recommendations 
Summary 
 
The research suggests a number of recommendations that might inform policy 
input, namely in terms of the review of the legislation. These recommendations 
seek to be reflective of the findings, including consideration of current contextual 
developments. 
Recommendations 
 
Legislation and guidance 
 
1. The first striking feature of the legislation is the lack of an audit 
requirement. Of the various reasons that we have heard for the absence of 
proper audit and assurance in the law, the most substantive are cost 
related. This stems in part from the complexity of some aspects of the 
requirements, more especially in terms of instances of project level 
reporting. Some of the required information here, to meet some of this 
particular requirement at least, may not be readily available internally.  If 
an audit or greater assurance is to be asked for, to improve the legislation, 
then a number of things might be considered together: (a) Is there scope 
for simplifying certain aspects of current provisions? Might even some of 
the requirements be taken out in order to increase assurance on key 
information such as the amounts of payments to governments by country 
at central and local government level? (b) Are all provisions of the 
Regulations yielding information that is equally valuable? Can this be 
clarified? Can evidence of usage, actual and potential, be evidenced and 
clarified? (c) Would ‘limited assurance’ be better than no assurance 
requirement at all? We note here that some companies have already given 
limited assurance even in the absence of a formal legal requirement. We 
have formed the strong opinion that limited assurance is much more likely 
to be found acceptable by the legislators than a full audit (based on 
expressed industry concerns). Some commentators made the point that 
under current rules no feedback is received at all after RPG are submitted. 
2. Initially we were of the view that the size of payments criteria should be 
dropped as it may make evasion more feasible. While the latter point has 
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some substance (and perhaps some limited provision might apply across 
the board), we found that many commentators saw the size criterion as 
being low. On reflection, given that it is on the face of it low in relative 
terms, companies significantly trying to disaggregate payments to take 
advantage of it would look particularly bad if they were at the same time 
making significant profits or had significant turnover. Perhaps some clause 
making disaggregation in this context difficult, linked to limited assurance 
provisions, might be appropriate. 
3. As required, the notion of substantially interconnected should be clarified. 
The UK law should reflect the clarified meaning. The clarified meaning of 
the law should seek to ensure that practices that companies might be 
tempted to follow currently should be explicitly outlawed. 
4. Companies falling under UK law must disclose in-scope payments made on 
their behalf (by operators or other agents). When an in-scope payment is 
made by an operator on behalf of participants in a joint venture, 
participating companies in the joint venture should disclose at least their 
share of the relevant payment. Companies should have regard to the 
underlying liability for the payment under local law. In respect of payments 
to governments made through joint venture arrangements, the suggestion 
that they cannot always be distinguished from other payments made to 
participators is arguably an unreasonable one. Companies ought to be 
expected to distinguish these payments, where at all possible. A revision of 
the law or further guidance on this point might make the position explicitly 
clear. 
5. In the absence of an audit or limited assurance, another feature attendant 
to the current legislation is of particular concern. How does anyone question 
the reports? One might consider asking for a clear procedure for challenging 
non-compliance that does not depend on the permission of the relevant 
Secretary of State or Director of Public Prosecutions or even the Company 
Registrar. If there was an audit or limited assurance requirement, then the 
failure to get clean reports might trigger investigations. 
6. We have indicated that reconciliation with the company accounts might be 
a useful requirement, especially where no assurance is given in respect of 
the RPG, given that the company accounts are audited. Consideration 
should again be given to how company accounts might also be amended to 
increase their usefulness to civil society. Progress with accounting 
standards has not been as good as with the law but there is a good rationale 
in relation to segmental reporting that should continue to be pushed. The 
same rationale applies in the context of stock exchange listing 
requirements. The information reported in the RPG purports to assist civil 
society in holding companies to account in terms of the economic 
contribution they make to resource rich countries. Furthermore, the 
information should assist investors in judging the merits of potential 
investments in terms of compliance with applicable tax laws and 
transparency displayed by companies. It is useful in relation to risk 
assessment. The RPG provide a level of detail not available in the accounts 
or elsewhere in company disclosure and to this extent they provide users 
with information which they would not otherwise have any access to.  
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7. It is recommended that the definition of extractive industries in Chapter 10 
be amended to take account of the integrated business models employed 
by a number of operating enterprises operating in the sector. This could be 
achieved through widening the scope of the definition of extractives as 
follows: ‘…any activity involving the exploration, prospection, discovery, 
development, and extraction of minerals, oil, natural gas deposits or other 
materials or activities connected therewith carried out by an associated 
enterprise’. 
 
Context 
 
8. One matter to consider is how various initiatives such as EITI and BEPS 
Action 13 can be more cohesively linked in order to facilitate better and 
more efficient transparency reporting.  We have indicated how the yielding 
of more insights into the reasonableness of tax payments would enhance 
provisions. At the same time, we are of the view that the RPG in themselves 
are valuable providers of information to civil society and to the investor 
community. Of course, we need to be concerned about levelling down 
standards rather than levelling up in this context. The deficiency of 
information in comparison to Action 13 templates might be highlighted in 
the consultation as a limiting factor in the usability of the RPG. This may 
potentially be addressed by publication of the type of country-by-country 
reporting referred to earlier, which will be mandatory for groups established 
in the UK for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016 but 
which are currently only required to be disclosed to HMRC. Further 
information which may be useful in assessing the legislative adherence of 
groups and the application of the law by governments could be the number 
of open enquiries, late filing penalties and scheduled judicial proceedings 
relating to taxation reported by groups for each jurisdiction in which they 
operate. These pieces of information could form a series of metrics which 
users could compare on a group by group basis; in order to assess both the 
compliance of groups with local laws and governments’ enforcement of the 
laws. Perhaps addressing how the various initiatives might work together 
to produce a better transparency regime is helpful input.   
9.  Civil society have found the information useful in various ways. They are 
encouraged to indicate that they have found some of the information useful 
and to illustrate this. Any evidence of usefulness should be provided. This 
will emphasize that there is something to hold on to and build upon. This is 
important for all aspects of the law that civil society is concerned to retain. 
It is helpful to also indicate positive potential usage as well as evidence 
actual usage. Commentators are expressing concern about lack of usage, 
which needs to be countered. There are a number of insights that might 
inform negotiations. And, in this regard, it is appreciated that in contexts of 
consultation and negotiation there are differing interests involved in respect 
of this area of legislation. Nevertheless, even in the current global context 
there may be some common ground in terms of an interest in common 
standards, for instance, and a basic acceptance of the need to act on the 
underlying issue. This may facilitate keeping enacted legislation on the 
statute books and improving it, which should be at the forefront of the 
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minds of negotiators. That companies have produced reports is a significant 
step forward. And there ought to be a recognition that it is too early to give 
a final assessment on the reporting practice. There are a number of positive 
indicators here concerning future prospects for the law. One positive 
strategy is to evidence usage of the reports that has been helpful, even 
while asking for improvements. PWYP has built up a number of effective 
counters to many arguments put by those seeking to reduce the costs of 
the law to them and these will no doubt be needed once more. One 
suggestion last time was that there might be a ‘primary listing’ exemption 
in regard to the provisions of the Transparency Directive. No doubt such 
arguments will be forthcoming again. But the experience of the legislation 
so far has not been as dramatically negative, on the face of it, as some of 
the comments suggested it would be.  
 
Operation 
 
10. Some commentators suggested that software was less than user friendly 
and required specialist IT input. A systems review in conjunction with 
preparers may help to make the process of filing less onerous to those 
required to report.  
 
Best practice 
 
11. The more useful RPG were those which contained explanations on how 
terms within The Regulations had been interpreted, for example definitions 
of payment types within the specific company context. This information 
gives users a better insight into how the reports have been prepared and 
the nature of companies’ contributions. We initially felt that reporting 
entities should be required to make clear in RPG that they have ‘nothing to 
disclose’ to enable discernment between this situation and non-compliance. 
Reflection on current law relating to disclosure in accounting, however, 
suggests that this would be an unusual provision and hence should not be 
a major ask. 
 
Further work to do (in progress) 
 
Following this publication, we are concerned to shift our focus to the EU level. We 
aim in this context to add to our findings and insights here and build an evidence 
based case for the continuation and the development of the law. This should yield 
output in terms of a corresponding report for PWYP and a further monograph. In 
addition, we are working on developing our research in this area for publication in 
academic journals. 
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A brief note on the authors 
 
Eleni Chatzivgeri, Lynsie Chew, Louise Crawford, Martyn Gordon and Jim Haslam 
are UK accounting academics whose research interests include the interface of 
accounting and wider regulatory forces and issues in enhancing accounting’s social 
relevance. The team have a wide range of research skills based on their collective 
experience. Eleni is based at the University of Westminster and Lynsie at 
University College London. Louise and Martyn are based at Robert Gordon 
University and Jim Haslam is at the University of Sheffield. Jim and Louise are 
leading the project as academics with long experience in the issues of concern, 
including having authored a number of papers in this area.   
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 – Company sample 
Appendix 1: Extractive 
Company Sample* 
      
Company Country of 
Incorporation 
Files available Files used 
for the 
descriptive 
analysis 
Panel A: Oil and Gas 
Companies 
      
BG GROUP* GB CSV file CSV file 
BP                                  GB CSV file and long 
Pdf 
CSV file 
CADOGAN PETROLEUM                  GB CSV file and short 
Pdf 
CSV file 
CAIRN ENERGY PLC                    GB CSV file and short 
Pdf 
CSV file 
ENDEAVOUR ENERGY UK LTD         GB CSV file CSV file 
ENQUEST PLC                         GB CSV file and short 
Pdf 
CSV file 
GAZPROM NEFT PJSC                   RU Pdf only Pdf file 
GREAT EASTERN ENERGY CORP          IN Pdf only Pdf file 
GULF KEYSTONE PETROLEUM LTD        BM Pdf only Pdf file 
JKX OIL & GAS                       GB CSV file CSV file 
KAZMUNAIGAS EXPLORATION 
PRODUCTION  
KZ Pdf only Pdf file 
LUKOIL PJSC                         RU Pdf only Pdf file 
NEXEN* GB CSV file CSV file 
NOSTRUM OIL & GAS PLC              GB CSV file and short 
Pdf 
CSV file 
NOVATEK OAO                         RU Pdf only Pdf only 
OPHIR ENERGY PLC                    GB Pdf only Pdf file 
REPSOL SINOPEC RESOURCES* GB CSV file CSV file 
ROSNEFT OIL CO                      RU Long Pdf file Long Pdf file 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL                   GB CSV file and long 
Pdf 
CSV file 
SEPLAT PETROLEUM DEVT CO PLC       NG Pdf only Pdf file 
SOCO INTERNATIONAL                  GB CSV file and short 
Pdf 
CSV file 
TATNEFT PJSC                        RU Pdf only Pdf file 
TULLOW OIL PLC                      GB CSV file and short 
Pdf 
CSV file 
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Panel B: Mining       
ACACIA MINING PLC                   GB CSV file and 
short Pdf 
CSV file 
ANGLO AMERICAN                      GB CSV file CSV file 
ANGLO ASIAN GB Pdf only Pdf file 
ANTOFAGASTA                         GB CSV file and 
short Pdf 
CSV file 
AVOCET MINING                       GB CSV file and 
short Pdf 
CSV file 
BHP BILLITON PLC                    GB CSV file and 
long Pdf 
CSV file 
CENTAMIN PLC                        JE Pdf only Pdf file 
FRESNILLO PLC                       GB CSV file and 
short Pdf 
CSV file 
GEM DIAMONDS LTD                    VG Pdf only Pdf file 
GLENCORE PLC                        JE CSV file and 
long Pdf 
CSV file 
HOCHSCHILD MINING PLC               GB CSV file CSV file 
KAZ MINERALS PLC                    GB CSV file and 
short Pdf 
CSV file 
NORD GOLD SE                        NL CSV file and 
short Pdf 
CSV file 
PETROPAVLOVSK PLC                   GB Pdf only Pdf file 
POLYMETAL INTL PLC                  JE Pdf only Pdf file 
RIO TINTO                           GB CSV file and 
long Pdf 
CSV file 
Panel C: Other       
CENTRICA PLC                        GB CSV file and 
short Pdf 
CSV file 
CHELIABINSK ELEKTROLIT ZINK 
PLANT   
RU Pdf only Pdf file 
EVRAZ PLC                           GB CSV file and 
long Pdf 
CSV file 
FERREXPO PLC                        GB CSV file CSV file 
GENEL ENERGY PLC                    JE Pdf only Pdf file 
HUNTING                             GB Pdf only Pdf file 
JARDINE MATHESON HLDGS              BM Pdf only Pdf file 
MONDI PLC                           GB CSV file and 
short Pdf 
CSV file 
NORSK HYDRO ASA                     NO Pdf only Pdf file 
NOVOLIPETSK IRON AND STEEL 
CORP     
RU Pdf only Pdf file 
PETROFAC LTD                      JE Pdf only Pdf file 
*Company not listed on LSE but included in the sample as it did fill in a report in 
the Companies House, at the time data was collected 
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Appendix 2 – Disclosure checklist 
 
Mandatory Requirements -  Report on Payments to Governments 
Regulations 2014 
Content of Report, for each financial year: 
Section  Disclosed or 
not 
5(1) Entity-level payments  
(a) The government to which each payment is made  
 The country of that government20  
(b) Total amount of payments made to each 
government 
 
(c) Total amount per type of payment made to each 
government 
 
 Project-level payments  
(d) Total amount of payments made for each project  
(d) Total amount per type of payment made for each 
project 
 
 Types of payment to be disclosed  
2(1) Production entitlements  
 Taxes levied on income, production of profits21  
 Royalties  
 Dividends (other than to government shareholders)  
 Signature, discovery and production bonuses  
 Fees: licence, rental entry, other and concessions  
 Infrastructure improvements  
 Other mandates  
5(3) Only payment all above £86,000  
5(4, 5)  Payments reflect substance over form (payment, 
activity and project) 
 
5(6) Payments in-kind 
• State value of each such payment 
• Volume of such payments 
• Explanation of how value determined 
 
 
 
Voluntary activities/disclosures 
5(3) Payments less than £86,000  
2(1) Project definition/operational activities  
10(1) Exempted subsidiaries (size; non UK parent)  
11(1) Exempted subsidiaries (information availability)  
12 Exempted duty to report - equivalence  
   
 
  
                                      
20 This requirement is not included in EU Accounting Directive, Chapter 10  
21 Excludes consumption taxes (VAT, personal income taxes or sales taxed) 
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Appendix 3 - Analysis of 23 companies’ payments to governments 
Mandatory 
Requirement 
Have 
paid 
Not 
paid 
any 
Not  
mentioned 
Aggregated with 
other items 
Government to which 
payments made 
19  4  
Total amount paid to 
each government 
21  2  
Project level 
payments 
17  6  
     
Production 
entitlements 
8 12 3  
Taxes levied 22  1  
Royalties 15 5 3  
Dividends 1 12 10  
Bonuses 3 13 7  
Fees 19 1 1 2 
Infrastructure 
improvements 
12 8 2 1 
     
Substance over form Only one company used the term ‘Substance’, and detailed 
how this had been interpreted in line with JV payments to 
an operator (BP) 
Payments in-kind Two companies state value, volume and explanation (BP 
and Royal Dutch Shell) 
One company gives explanation but no value or volume 
(Glencore) 
 
 
This initial analysis was performed after our review of the legislation and was 
used to develop our semi-structured interview questionnaire and our disclosure 
checklist (Appendix 2). 
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